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industry as a test case to see whether such competitive impacts of the Internet might
already be occurring. Comparable possible impacts of the introduction of personal
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three decades suggest that the Internet did not have such a radical effect on market
structure by the year 2000.
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Recent discussion about impacts of the Internet on business suggests radical benefits of
early entry into pioneering new electronic markets. Firms that lag in adoption of Internet
sales and services may be left behind, as competitors take over the electronic markets
and non-electronic markets contract. Traditional market leaders could lose out, after
failing to build up the relevant electronic expertise and customer networks.
These ideas about potential impacts of the Internet on industry competition echo a
recent academic literature on how the leading firms in an industry can lose their
positions to new entrants and small firms. Christensen (1997), for example, uses hard-
disk manufacturers and other companies to illustrate how incumbent firms often
succumb to competition by innovative entrants. He argues that businesses must be
continually wary, ready to grasp enabling new technologies or lose ground in the fierce
competition that follows radical technological change. Similarly, a succession of authors
before him have analysed why incumbent firms fail to respond adequately to major new
technologies, and hinted at strategies for entrants and incumbents in the face of potential
technological revolution.
If the Internet is to have such revolutionary impacts, might any of those impacts be
visible already? This paper uses a service industry with high computer and Internet
usage to check for possible impacts of new IT on firm and industry structure. The
industry analysed is computer consultancies in the United Kingdom. The evidence
indicates that the rise of the Internet has not substantially increased exit or market
leadership turnover among UK computer consultancies. This finding is counter to the
notion that the Internet is (so far) causing a shift in firm survival patterns to benefit
innovative new firms. Although new firms have been more likely to do business
involving networking and the Internet, entrants with these types of business have not
been systematically more likely to survive and grow. Thus, at least in one IT-intensive
service industry, the Internet appears not yet to have had the sort of competitive impacts
predicted for radical new innovations.
1 Radical technological change and competition
Notwithstanding many early, highly aggregated studies to the contrary, computerization
is yielding enormous productivity gains for firms. In 1999, US firms invested some
$510 billion in IT equipment and software, with upstream information technology-
producing industries contributing about 8 per cent of price-weighted US economic
output for the year (US Department of Commerce 2000). Indeed, firms’ total investment
in information technology may be as much as ten times higher (Brynjolfsson and Yang
1997) when considerable co-investments in IT are considered. Relevant co-investments
range from physical equipment to be used in conjunction with computers to training,
organizational restructuring to take fuller advantage of new equipment and software,
and managerial innovation to continually improve use of IT equipment and software.1
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), in their valuable review of the literature to date on how IT
1 Brynjolfsson and Yang’s (1997) estimate of intangible IT investments relies on stock market
valuations to assess the intangibles. Scepticism about the reasons for large stock market valuations of
IT companies suggests caution in interpreting this figure, although Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000a: 28)
point to an empirical survey of resource planning projects that yields an even higher estimate of IT-
related intangible investments. Better estimates await additional detailed empirical study.2
is affecting organizational form and performance, show that macroeconomic
measurement problems have been obscuring the contribution of IT to economic growth
and even the overall rate of GDP growth. Even before correcting for such major sources
of mismeasurement, though, US productivity growth has doubled since 1995, and the
increase has commonly been attributed to more and better use of information
technologies. The US has taken a lead in information technology and use of the Internet,
but other countries clearly are also rapidly adopting these computer and
communications changes.
Increased use of computing and the advent of the Internet can be seen as radical
technological changes with corresponding impacts on the industries that depend on
these technologies. Technological changes have often been divided into two categories,
disruptive changes that hamper the competitive abilities of incumbent firms, and
sustaining changes that reinforce the advantages of incumbents. Disruptive
technological changes frequently coincide with turnover in which firms hold the leading
market shares, as new entrants take advantage of technologies in ways that incumbents
cannot or do not exploit. Sustaining technological changes, in contrast, contribute to an
exodus of less-established firms while leading incumbents reinforce their market
leadership. The Internet and new generations of computers have often been thought to
have disruptive effects by creating new electronic markets that may displace existing
markets, and by allowing more efficient work practices that are challenging for existing
firms to adopt.
1.2 Corporate leadership turnover
Tushman and Anderson (1986) argue that radical technological changes may be
opportunities that new firms tend to exploit but to which incumbents tend to respond
relatively badly or late.2 They use their point of view, based on implicit notions about
the competencies of old and new firms in different technology areas, to draw out
implications regarding entry, exit, market share, and other matters. In their view, radical
technologies that are inconsistent with past technology are first commercialized largely
by new entrants, with incumbents tending to exit after the introduction of the new
technology. Consequently, entry and exit would be expected to rise temporarily upon
the availability of the new technology, and large incumbent firms would be expected to
contract unusually rapidly while small recent entrants would be expected to grow
unusually rapidly. A similar view has been apparent in studies of many industries,
including Majumdar (1982) and Schnaars (1994).3
2 Tushman and Anderson argue that this behaviour occurs only for major technological changes that are
at odds with previous approaches, not for changes that involve the existing technological approaches
in a more efficient or effective way. The changes considered in this study, the use of personal
computers and the advent of the Internet as a medium for communication, appear in many ways to be
radically different from the approaches previously in use, and have been labelled widely as
discontinuities, thus fitting with the characterization given in the text for Tushman and Anderson’s
approach.
3 Audretsch (1991) promotes a related view in which he divides industries into two categories, ones
with ‘routinized’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ technological regimes. In industries with routinized regimes,
established firms have an advantage in R&D, whereas in industries with entrepreneurial regimes, new
firms have the advantage in performing and implementing innovations, and these differences affect
firm survival rates.3
Contrasting explanations exist as to why incumbent firms have failed to take advantage
of the opportunities offered by major technological changes. Majumdar (1982),
Tushman and Anderson (1986), and Anderson and Tushman (1990) seem to view the
issue in terms of firms’ core technological competencies, with firms not possessing
the techniques and equipment needed to pursue the new technology unable to make the
transition without a very high cost and indeed unable even to perceive the importance of
the coming revolution. Henderson and Clark (1990) point to firms’ R&D and
engineering personnel, the people who deal with the technology most directly, and
argue that these employees develop ways of thinking about the technology (both
individually and as an organization) that are inconsistent with pertinent innovative
approaches. Because of this limiting mindset, they fail to take advantage of the
opportunities afforded by the new technological approach. Christensen and Rosenbloom
(1995) point to firms’ relationships with customers, and argue that incumbent firms tend
to maintain their current technological approach because their customers demand
products or services that initially can be best provided using the established technology.
They fail to pay sufficient attention to the potential profits that could be obtained from
new customers using the new technology, and they fail to realize that the new
technology eventually may largely replace the old. Any of these reasons, along with
others mentioned by Schnaars (1994), could be responsible for the sort of turnover of
leading firms described by Tushman and Anderson (1986).
If radical technological changes act as these theories describe to cause market leadership
turnover, several consequences should result. These hypothesized consequences provide
a means to assess whether, to date, the Internet is having large disruptive technological
effects. The following competitive impacts would be expected in industries that begin to
make use of the Internet:
Consequence 1: Entry of new firms will increase following the technological change.
Consequence 2: The aggregate exit rate of firms will increase following the
technological change.
Consequence 3: The exit rate of new firms will fall, and the exit rate of incumbent firms
rise, following the technological change. The growth rate of new firms will rise,
but the growth rate of incumbent firms fall, following the technological change.
Consequence 4: A greater percentage of new firms than old firms will use the disruptive
technology.
Consequence 5: Firms using the disruptive technology will, ceteris paribus, have higher
growth rates and lower exit rates than firms not using the disruptive technology.
These consequences are natural implications of a disruptive technology. Firms seek to
take advantage of profit opportunities created by the new technology, causing more
annual entry for a period following the advent of the new technology. Once new firms
enter, they intensify market competition, eventually even overthrowing many or all of
the incumbent market leaders. Hence the exit rate of all firms rises, at least eventually.
The new firms, with the highest propensity to use the new technology, have a
competitive advantage. Thus new firms have a higher growth rate and a lower exit rate
relative to other eras, while incumbents disadvantaged by their outdated technology
have relatively low growth and high exit. Technology, not newness, is the source of4
advantage, so these growth and exit consequences pertain to indicators of technology
use as well as to newness. Consequences 2-5 above are similar to hypotheses 2, 5, and 7
of Tushman and Anderson (1986).
1.2 Reinforcing R&D and exodus of the weak
A contrasting competitive pattern would result from reinforcing technology. For
example, Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) argue that exogenous radical technological
changes may lead to a drop-off in the number of producers in an industry, with
incumbent firms benefiting from an early-entry advantage. Klepper (1996) proposes a
related model, involving large numbers of ongoing technological changes, in which
some early market entrants grow large and dominate the market in the long run through
their dominance of R&D. That such sustaining technological changes are extremely
important in many major industries is evidenced by a series of studies by Klepper and
Simons (cf. 1997, 2000). These studies show that the common pattern of steady decline
in number of companies in an industry, and eventual market concentration, is associated
with lasting competitive advantage among a few early entrants that grow large.
Moreover, the studies indicate that (at least in many industries) the leading firms
dominate the R&D process for sustaining technologies, and their R&D success is
directly associated with greatly enhanced growth and likelihood of survival. With
reinforcing technology, exit rather than entry would follow the technological change,
and incumbents rather than entrants would tend to adopt the new technology and hence
benefit from enhanced growth and survival rates.
1.3 Technology and regional industry growth
Technology-driven industries, especially IT industries, are the hoped-for spur of
economic growth in many lower-income countries. If the Internet or computerization
are disruptive radical technologies, they can be used to advantage—even in lower-
income countries where IT infrastructure may not be well-established—to aid in the
growth of IT-generating or IT-using industries. National and corporate policies might be
adapted according to the effects of these technological changes.
Successes in several Asian economies have shown that developing countries can
achieve strong IT industries, despite international competition. Growth of indigenous
skills and technology has been crucial to these countries’ success. In some industries,
employee skill is the bottleneck. Good education allowed India’s software
subcontracting industry to boom, raising salaries for Indian citizens with strong
technical education. In other industries, technological strengths are important.
Semiconductor fabrication and packing, computer components, assembled computers,
and pre-packaged software all have demanded to varying degrees the growth of large
knowledge bases pertinent to specific industries. How are the relevant employee skills
and technologies best acquired?
Technology development models for developing countries have fallen into two broad
classes: linear versus leapfrog views. The successful linear approach is illustrated by the
experience of Korea’s Anam Industrial, the world’s largest semiconductor packaging
company. As Hobday (1995) characterizes based on interviews with senior staff, Anam
went through successive phases of linear technology growth. Anam began packaging5
computer chips into plastic and ceramic cases in 1968-80 with considerable help from
US clients, which provided machinery, engineering assistance, product design
information, and materials. By 1980-85, the firm set up greater in-house process
engineering, again aided by US companies such as Texas Instruments. With its new
Engineering R&D Department, in the late 1980s into the 1990s Anam increasingly took
charge of incremental process engineering and began to develop its own new
approaches for production processes and designs for semiconductor packages. The
gradual technology diffusion into Anam, followed by steady growth in in-house
engineering capabilities, helped Anam to reach US $1.8 billion of export sales by 1992.
The successful leapfrogging approach, in contrast, promises to allow firms rapidly to
become internationally competitive. The chief designer of an internationally successful
Chinese language printing system, developed by Founder of China, put it this way:
In high-tech areas, there are big lags between our country and advanced
countries. Many new ideas and methods originate abroad…. However,
we should not be satisfied with merely catching up because this would
not come up with competitive products. It was inevitable that we would
catch up for quite a long time. However, it was possible to leap forward
based on our indigenous innovative capabilities (Quoted in Lu
2000: 132).
Founder succeeded at leapfrogging. If it had caught up more slowly, Founder likely
would have failed, or at least been constrained by lack of funds, in the face of intense
competition versus firms from the US, UK, and Japan. Founder was able to succeed at
leapfrogging because an opportunity existed for a disruptive new technology with
sizeable potential market demand, and because it entered quickly and developed the
leading-edge technology in the field.
Whether linear or leapfrog approaches can best succeed depends on the industry in
question and the kinds of technological change ongoing. Where ongoing technological
changes reinforce the strengths of incumbent firms, the leapfrog approach typically
would require a daunting effort far too expensive to be worthwhile. Instead, market
niches are often available to make a profit in some part of the industry, perhaps aided by
low labour costs, national incentive schemes, or advantageous geography. Catching-up
firms in lower-income countries may become loci of technology transfer, spurring
growth as for Anam Industrial. Where ongoing technological changes are disruptive or
create entirely novel markets, opportunities exist for firms to take a lead in pioneering
new technologies. In lower-income countries, pockets of specialized knowledge and
skill may provide the crucial head start to succeed at developing an internationally
competitive version of the new technology. Founder, for example, benefited from early
university research as well as unusual access to talented engineering graduate students
at China’s leading university. Financial investments for new firm development, when
directed according to these principles, need not be large and can be arranged in ad-hoc
ways so long as the firm retains the right incentives and freedoms.
Given claims about the radical impacts of the Internet, one might expect that it will
provide many opportunities for disruptive technological change in which clever firms
might be able establish new markets or even take over leadership in important new
markets. Thus, the Internet might be expected to provide a variety of unusual
opportunities that could be harnessed by firms in lower-income nations, spurring6
economic growth in the nations to which they belong. Whether the Internet in fact has
such impacts remains to be seen. This study therefore turns next to an examination of
one particular industry in which any early competitive impacts of the Internet might
already be apparent.
2 IT consultants in the United Kingdom
If computers and electronic communications really are radical technologies causing
radical change in firm and industrial structure, and if they are already having an effect,
how can these changes be detected? One can search for regularities associated with
disruptive radical change, including increased entry and exit and a relative increase in
growth of recent entrants versus incumbents. Given that most industries have so far
experienced few impacts of the Internet, it is desirable to choose a kind of industry in
which usage of the Internet—and potential impacts on work organization—are
unusually high. The industry studied here is UK computer consulting, whose
professionals make much use of the Internet (even as a business market) and for which
there is an extensive historical data source.
The computer consulting industry may be a better window on possible industry trends
associated with computing and the Internet than almost any other single industry. It is a
service industry, and hence represents the majority (and much less studied relative to
manufacturing) services component of the global economy. The service industries
perhaps more than any others can take advantage of the IT revolution, because they tend
to be less limited by physical production methods than manufacturing, resource
extraction, or agriculture. Computer consultants are among the leading adopters of
computer equipment and novel work practices that work well with IT and
communications technologies, and hence they may reflect impacts of IT, networking,
and the Internet earlier than firms in other industries.
2.1 Data
This study relies on data compiled in VNU Business Publications’ (1969-2001) annual
industry directory, The Computer User’s Year Book.T h eYear Book has tracked British
computer consultants since its inception.4 The Year Book made no claims to be
complete, although it appears to have included a large percentage of firms in the
industry. In addition to listing the firms involved, it provided detailed information on,
among other matters, each firm’s number of employees, its fees per day of work, and
the types of applications with which it deals. The annual lists reported in this directory
were matched to determine for each firm the years in which it was listed in the
directory. Names and addresses of firms, among other information, were used to ensure
that longitudinal records were (to a large degree) properly matched over time. Multiple
branches of a firm were treated as a single entity, not as individual establishments.
The Year Book did not differentiate between consultancies and software houses in 1969
and 1970, nor did it indicate firms’ numbers of employees or prices in those years.
4 Since Britain is one of the nations leading in adoption of IT technologies, it may serve as a model for
the experiences that similar industries may follow in other countries.7
Therefore data are used from the 1971 edition onward. The 1984 edition of the directory
could not be obtained, and entry and exit rates presented are corrected by dividing
entrants equally across 1984 and 1985 and by dividing exits after the 1983 edition over
the two years following 1983. The Year Book was generally compiled and published
during the year preceding the date on its cover, yielding a time span of 1970-2000
excluding 1983. Circa the 1989 edition, the Year Book removed some types of software
houses from the definition of consultants included in its lists, and added other types of
consultancies, resulting in a structural break in the types of firms and services included.
To lessen the impacts of this break, the (relatively few) firms that are indicated as
having been software houses but that did not perform other types of consultancy have
been excluded from analyses. The definition of consultancies included in the data has
also broadened by a lesser degree at other points in time. Dates referred to hereafter
pertain to the year of publication, just preceding the date on the cover of each Year
Book.
International consultancies make up a small percentage of firms in the sample. Only
firms with one or more branches in the United Kingdom have been retained in the data.
The Year Book does not report market shares, but its figures on number of employees,
available for most firms, provide information on the size distribution of companies. In
2000 the top ten full-time employers had 3,260, 3,000, 2,500, 2,000, 1,500, 1,000, 900,
900, 800, and 700 full-time employees respectively. This constitutes 40 per cent of
reported full-time employees in that year. The top ten in 2000 were all multinationals,
six of them UK-originated. The bulk of the sample in contrast consists of small
businesses. The mean and median numbers of full-time employees per firm in 2000
were only 29 and 5 respectively. It is such smaller, almost all UK-only, firms that have
the largest effect in most analyses of the data.
The number of firms included in the analysis totals 7,332. The sample begins with 84
firms in 1970, and the number rapidly rises to much larger counts: 285 in 1975, 508 in
1977, 731 in 1979, and 1,068 in 1981. Thereafter the number of firms remains roughly
stable through 1985, and falls to 919 in 1986 and 879 in 1987. The number then rises
suddenly given the break in the definition of firms listed in the Year Book. In 1988,
1,515 firms are included, and the number thereafter rises and falls irregularly. By 1993,
1,933 firms are included; the number falls to 1,594 in 1998 and then jumps to 1,902 in
1999 and falls again to 1,677 in 2000. It is possible that these changes in sample sizes
reflect industry trends, but the sample sizes may also reflect periodic shifts in data
collection practices used to compile the Year Book.
Additional data used are time series of the number of Internet hosts and UK annual
percentage growth in GDP. The number of Internet hosts is a measure of the size of the
Internet and is taken from the Domain Survey of the Internet Software Consortium.5
Internet host figures have been interpolated where necessary to pertain to July of each
year. UK GDP growth statistics are based on the UK National Statistics Office dataset
gvao: ‘Gross Domestic Product by Gross Value Added, 1948-2001’, series YBEZ for all
industries and series GDQS for all service industries. Percentage growth in the reported
real values has been computed relative to the preceding year. Dummy variables are
constructed for time periods of exogenous radical innovation equal to 1 in 1983-87
following the introduction of personal computers, or 1 in 1995-2000 for the rise of the
5 http://www.isc.org/8
Internet, and 0 at all other times. The latter period coincides with the time when the
number of Internet hosts surpassed ten million.
2.2 Interactions between entry, growth, and exit
Hypotheses relating radical IT changes to entry, exit, growth, and optimal firm size can
be analysed using the following three-equation model:
Et = f(pt,Tt)+e t (1)
dSit /dt
Sit
= g(pt,Sit,T t)+g it (2)
Pr ob(Xit) = h(Sit,Tt)( 3 )
Equation (1) concerns the number of entrants Et at each time t. Entry is a function of the
industry mean price pt, which serves as a measure of profit opportunity, and of recent
exogenous technological change Tt, which equals 1 for a period after a major
technological change and 0 at all other times. The random term et allows for random
v a r i a t i o ni nE t, which for statistical analyses will be assumed to follow a negative
binomial distribution. Equation (2) concerns the percentage growth rate in the size Sit of
firm i at time t. Each firm’s growth rate is assumed to be a function of pt,T t, and Sit.F o r
statistical analyses, a normally-distributed random term g it is also included. Equation
(3) concerns the probability of exit Xit by firm i at time t, where Xit = 1 if the firm exits
and 0 otherwise. The exit probability is a function of the firm’s size and of recent
exogenous technological change. For statistical analyses, exit will be modelled using a
logistic model.6
Price depends on industry-wide output Qt, which depends in turn on the production of
individual firms: pt = Dt
-1(Qt), Q t = qit(Sit)  ,w h e r eD t
-1(×) is the inverse demand
function at time t and qit(×) is a production function that may vary across firms and
time. Price and firm sizes are observed, but not industry-wide output, so the relationship
between pt and Qt will not be analysed statistically. Similarly, unmeasured changes in
labour supply and hence in wages also affect the price charged by firms.
Statistical analyses used to supplement the analysis are carried out separately for the
time periods before and after the structural change in the data. Analyses of entry
exclude the year 1988, for which entry may result from change in the types of firms
included. Analyses of exit exclude the year 1987, since firms that survived in 1987
might have been removed from the list in 1988 due to changes in classification.
Analyses of growth likewise exclude comparisons between years before 1988 and later
years.
6 The three equations used here should not be confused with a simultaneous equation econometric
system; they form a dynamic system of three equations that can be estimated independently.9
2.3 Testing for effects of radical technological change
The theories about impacts of radical technological change, discussed in the previous
section, yield widely contrasting implications for what should happen to entry, and exit
following the technological change. For the computer consultancy industry, while
several exogenous technological changes might be identified a priori as having
potential effects on competition, the intent of this paper is to search for outstanding
effects of IT on competition in ways that might also affect other industries. The primary
focus here is therefore the advent of the Internet. The rise in use of computer networks
also may have yielded new competitive rules, particularly with the inception and
growing use of the Internet around 1992-94. In addition, the advent of personal
computers has been implicated for market leadership shifts in the computer and hard
disk drive industries (Tushman and Anderson 1986; Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995)
and is sometimes suggested to have affected service industries, so the advent of personal
computers in 1981 and 1982 will also be considered as a radical technological change.
The theories make specific predictions about entry and exit patterns following the time
of the innovation relative to earlier years. And they yield contrasting predictions about
the ability of new entrants to capture market share from incumbents, and hence the
growth rates of small new entrants and small upstart firms versus incumbents, after the
innovation.
2.3.1 Price levels
Before examining possible effects of radical technological change on entry, exit, and
growth, it is important to understand any possible confounding effects of shifting
demand and labour supply. As demand increases or labour supply falls, the price
charged by firms should rise. Sufficient price rise could encourage entry into the
industry, spur firm growth, and reduce exit. The price level is thus the way in which
demand and labour supply changes might affect entry, growth, and exit.
To analyse price levels in the industry, the fees charged by firms per day of consultancy
services were recorded periodically from the Year Book.7 Except in the early years of
the Year Book, a majority of firms reported fees specifically for consultancy services,
with 58 per cent of firms reporting this information by 1976, 58 per cent in 2000, and
slightly higher percentages for most years in the interim.8 Relatively little information is
available in 1988, when the Year Book was reorganized. Most firms gave a range of list
prices rather than a single number, and in these cases the minimum list price is used.
Maximum price levels were not used because they often went unreported (with firms
instead using an open-ended price scale such as ‘from £300 per day’), and because the
maximum figures may be less reliable in that they pertain to specialized employees or
7 Fees were collected at two-year intervals from 1970 through 1984, and then in 1985 and 1987 because
the Year Book did not list fees for 1986. With the reorganization of the Year Book for 1988, data in
both 1988 and 1989 were recorded given the low frequency of reporting in 1988, and thereafter data
were collected at two-year intervals through 1999, and data for 2000 were added following
publication. Two-yearly intervals were used to reduce data collection expenses.
8 In a few cases, fees were reported per hour, week, or month, and fees per day were computed
assuming 8 working hours per day, 5 working days per week, or 20 working days per month. The few
instances where fees were reported in non-British currencies were excluded from price calculations.10
wishful thinking. Table 1 reports median and mean fees charged per day of consulting
work using the minimum list prices of firms in the sample. The figures are not weighted
according to size of firm, because the available size figures are not always reliable for
the sample’s very large firms which would have the greatest influence on size-weighted
means. Prices are discounted into 2000 £ using the Office for National Statistics’ retail
prices index (dataset ST30611). The number of firms for which figures are available in
each year, and the percentage of the sample composed by these firms, are indicated in
the last two columns of Table 1. The figures presented in Table 1 appear to give a
reliable assessment of trends in consultancy fees over the period 1970-2000.
Comparisons may not be reliable between years up to 1987 versus 1988 onward, given
the structural break in the data.
Both the median and mean price levels show surprisingly little change in prices over
time. The median price varied by only 22 per cent of its maximum during the years
1970-85 and 19 per cent during 1987-2000, and the mean price by only 17 per cent and
14 per cent respectively during the same two periods. Judging from both price
indicators, real fees fell 17 per cent from 1970 to 1974, rose 28 per cent/13 per cent
(median/mean) by 1980, then fell slightly by 1982 and rose again by 1985. The rise of
PC usage thus coincides with a period when IT consultancy prices increased slightly,
similar to the ups and downs seen in earlier prices. The median and mean prices show
substantial increases in 1987, although it is difficult to know whether this comes from
an actual price increase or from the Year Book’s reorganization of the data.
Table 1
Trends in real median and mean fee per day of IT consultancy work,
at minimum list prices, UK, 1970-2000
Fee, real £ per day Sample size
Year Median Mean No %o ff i r m s
1970 396 441 10 12
1972 391 372 16 14
1974 331 363 47 28
1976 361 392 233 58
1978 388 404 451 74
1980 425 410 733 77
1982 386 399 820 76
1984 398 396 821 77
1985 412 434 813 77
1987 517 524 620 71
1988 413 468 628 41
1989 459 463 891 56
1991 419 451 1,006 63
1993 424 457 1,278 66
1995 459 476 1,119 64
1997 434 482 1,115 68
1999 461 484 1,242 65
2000 450 488 972 5811
From 1988 through 2000, the price of IT consultancy remained nearly constant. The
median price rose from 1988 to 1989, and then both median and mean prices decreased
through 1991 before rising somewhat through 1995. Thereafter prices remained roughly
constant through 2000, with the biggest variation in the data being a small temporary
dip in the median price around 1997. The rise of Internet usage in the late 1990s thus
coincides with a period of fairly constant price.
The quite small changes in price suggest that shifts in demand and labour availability
had little effect on competition among IT consultancies, simply because the shifts were
minor. Moreover, comparisons will be made between firms that are smaller or larger,
younger or older, and participants or non-participants in an area of business. To
whatever extent demand and labour supply shifts affected entry, growth, and exit, only
shifts that differentially affect these types of firms could influence the patterns studied
below. Therefore, perhaps surprisingly, the forces of demand growth and skilled labour
growth seem in net to have little effect on the competitive issues examined below.
2.3.2 Entry, exit and growth of IT consultancies
Do entry and exit patterns coincide with the theories about disruptive technological
change? Consider first entry, which should increase following the technological change
as stated in Consequence 1 of the theories. Figure 1 plots the number of new IT
consultancies included in the data in each year from 1970 to 2000 excluding 1988. The
number of entrants remained low until the mid-1970s, averaging 39 firms per year in
1970-74, climbing to 149 firms per year in 1975-78, then rising to 185 firms in 1979,
293 in 1980, and 324 in 1981. After this time, and coincident with the advent of
personal computers, annual entry fell back to an average of 159 firms per year in 1982-
87. The number of entrants was rising somewhat in 1985 and 1987, consistent with a
possible delayed impact of personal computers on entry. With the reorganization of the
Year Book’s listings for 1988, 842 new firms were included. Over the next five-year
period, 1989-93, entry averaged 400 firms per year. The rise of the Internet in general
did not correspond to a rise in entry, although there is some sign of a rise in entry in
2000. In 1994 the number of entrants had fallen to 230, and although the number rose to
541 in 1995, it fall back again to an average of 215 in 1996-99. Only in 2000 is there
some sign of a rise in entry, with 265 new firms.
The data reveal little sign of increased entry following the introductions of the personal
computer and the Internet. Averaging over the years after these technological events,
there is actually less entry than in the preceding years. The only sign of any increase in
entry comes at the end of each of the two periods, but the rise in entry at these times is
well within the range of typical fluctuations. Indeed, negative binomial regressions of
entry on dummy variables for the radical innovation time periods yield insignificant
effects of the radical innovations, and in fact a negative estimated effect of the Internet
on entry.9 When GDP growth is controlled, the regressions do yield a positive and
9 As noted earlier, negative binomial regressions were estimated for entry data before versus after 1988,
using as periods of radical innovation 1983-87 for the introduction of personal computers and 1995-
2000 for the rise of the Internet. Results pertaining to GDP growth are the same regardless whether
growth is measured for all industries or for services, and GDP growth has a negative estimated
coefficient (significant in the earlier time period). The negative binomial model fits significantly better
than a Poisson model (which yields a significant positive coefficient for personal computers but a
significant negative coefficient for the Internet). Using the number of Internet hosts in year t in place
of the Internet time period dummy yields a significant negative estimated relation between the rise of12
significant estimated association between the personal computer innovation dummy and
entry, but a negative estimated association between the Internet innovation dummy and
entry. (Controlling for the interpolated mean real price of consultancy services, one
reaches the same conclusions.) Thus there is mixed evidence that the personal computer
might have yielded increased entry of UK IT consultancies in the 1980s, but the rise of
the Internet so far appears to have led to little if any increase in entry of IT
consultancies.
Consider next the exit rate. As indicated in Consequence 2, the theories suggest that a
rise in firms’ exit rate will follow a disruptive technological change. As indicated in
Consequence 3, the theories also have consequences for the relative success of
incumbents versus new entrants. First, corporate leadership turnover driven by
disruptive technology implies a rise in the probability of exit of incumbent market
leaders relative to small and new firms. Second, it implies a decrease in the rate of
growth of incumbent market leaders relative to new firms.
The annual percentage of IT firms that appear in a given year’s register but exit
permanently by the next year is shown by the solid curve in Figure 2. The exit rate was
moderately high initially, fell throughout the 1970s, rose to an average of 17.2 per cent
in 1980-81, fell to an average of 9.6 per cent in 1982-83, then rose again to an average
of 17.7 per cent in 1984-85 and 23.1 per cent in 1986-87. Thus, no increase in firms’
exit rate was apparent in 1982-83 immediately after the advent of the personal
computer, but the exit rate rose substantially in 1984 through 1987. In 1988-90, after the
reorganization of the Year Book’s list, the exit rate remained high at 22.4 per cent. In
1991-93 the exit rate averaged 15.0 per cent, and it grew to 22.4 per cent again in 1994
before falling back to an average of 15.1 per cent in 1995-98 and then growing to 36.9
per cent in 1999. The exit rate in 1999 was the highest ever, suggesting a potential very
recent effect of the rise of the Internet on exit; otherwise recent exit rates in the Internet
era have been modest. Logistic regressions of exit on the radical innovation variables,
regardless of the introduction of pertinent control variables, show a positive and
significant relationship between exit and the time of introduction of the PC but a
negative and significant relationship between exit and the rise of the Internet.10 Thus
there is evidence that the rise of the PC was associated with a rise of exit, but the growth
of Internet usage has coincided with no rise in exit other than the jump in 1999.
the Internet and entry. The mean real fee reported in Table 1 was linearly interpolated to obtain values
for all years (the only substantial differences occur when adding the variable to the model using
Internet hosts, in which case the hosts estimate remains negative but becomes insignificant, and when
adding it to the second-period Poisson model, in which case the innovation dummy estimate becomes
positive and insignificant.) Hence the findings reported above apparently are robust to alternative
specifications.
10 Control variables were introduced for the logarithm of firm total employment, GDP growth (overall
and alternatively in services), and the linearly interpolated mean real fee reported in Table 1; none of
the combinations of controls considered altered the observed significant relationships. Results for the
rise of the Internet are the same regardless whether the measure of Internet growth is the 1995-2000
dummy or the annual number of Internet hosts. Asymptotic Huber-White standard errors computed
with clustering by year imply an insignificant relationship between innovation and exit in the latter
time period, although still a significant relationship (p<.05) in the earlier time period falling to
marginal significance (p<.10) as controls are introduced.13
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What about the relative exit and growth rates of incumbents versus new firms? Did the
ratio of the exit rate of incumbents to that of recent entrants rise during the 1980s and
the late 1990s, as the disruptive technology theories imply following a radical
technological change? And did the ratio of the growth rate of incumbents to that of
recent entrants decrease during the 1980s and late 1990s, as the theories imply?14
If turnover of corporate leadership affected the exit rate as the theories imply at the time
of the major technological changes, then the exit rate of incumbents would tend to rise,
and/or the exit rate of recent entrants would tend to fall, after the times of the
technological changes. These changes would be expected to occur beginning in 1982
following the advent of personal computers, although possibly any effects of PCs on
firm survival might have occurred later. If use of the Internet has already affected firms’
survival, the period from 1995 onward should have had a similar shift in firms’ survival.
Figure 2 indicates separately the exit rates of entrants in the four most recent years
versus incumbents (earlier entrants). Recent entrants are indicated by the dashed curve
with relatively high exit rates, while incumbents are indicated by the dashed curve with
relatively low exit rates. The exit rates of recent entrants tend to increase or decrease in
tandem with those of incumbents. But in some years the exit rates of the two groups lie
far apart, signalling a strong advantage to incumbents, while in other years the exit rates
lie close together, signalling a time of high success for recent entrants. The ratio of
percentage exit of entrants divided by that of incumbents is indicated by the + symbol; a
high ratio indicates a strong disadvantage to recent entrants. The times of high success
for recent entrants relative to incumbents, judging by a ratio less than 1.5, are 1976-77,
1984, and 1986-87 before the reorganization of the data in 1988, and 1990-91, 1994,
and 1998-99 afterward. This finding appears to be possibly consistent with the
disruptive technology theories for personal computers, and consistent with the theories
regarding impacts of the Internet on competition by 1998-99. Logistic regressions of
exit that incorporate age-innovation interactions yield positive and significant estimated
effects of both radical innovations on exit, after the introduction of controls, suggesting
that the observed patterns are consistent with the disruptive innovation theories for both
the PC and Internet eras.11
Table 2 reports the growth rates of surviving firms over four-year periods. Periods are
used beginning in 1974, 1978, 1982, 1988, 1992, and 1996.12 Firms’ sizes in the base
year and four years later are measured in terms of the number of consultants employed
11 Key variables for the age-innovation interactions are the innovation time period dummy (or
alternatively the Internet hosts variable), the recent entry dummy, and the multiple of these two
variables. Control variables were introduced for the logarithm of firm total employment, GDP growth
(overall), and the linearly interpolated mean real fee reported in Table 1. Without controls the
interaction term is estimated to be statistically significant only in the later period and then only when
the Internet time period dummy is used rather than the number of Internet hosts. The results are
sensitive to specification. A random effects logit model yields positive estimates for the interaction
variable for both the PC and the Internet, but the estimate is statistically significant only for the
Internet. Using GDP growth in services rather than all sectors also causes the PC interaction estimate
to become insignificant. In both periods the estimated relation between innovation and exit loses
significance if a pertinent year (e.g. 1986 or 1999) is removed from the analysis and can change sign if
a pertinent pair of adjacent years is removed from the analysis, leaving open the possibility that other
period-specific events are at work.
12 The choice of years is dictated by the two periods of the sample, before the Year Book’s
reorganization in 1988 and in its reorganized form in later years, by the inability to distinguish recent
entrants from incumbents circa 1970, and by the lack of information for 1983. The use of 4-year
periods helps to remove noise that would arise from the data using shorter periods and helps allow for
the possibility that firm employment data may not have been updated every year by every firm. The
focus on surviving firms is similar to that used in most comparable literature and in this case is
dictated by the large standard errors that result when measuring growth of total employment across all
firms and by the impracticality of computing measures of growth rates (such as the median) allowing
for the -¥ growth rate of the roughly 50 per cent of firms that exit within four years.15
by each firm; firms lacking employment data in either year are excluded. In panel A of
the table, mean exponential growth rates are shown in terms of the number of full-time
employees, whereas in panel B the number of full-time plus part-time employees is used
when measuring growth rates. In each panel of the table, firms are divided into two
categories according to whether they entered the sample within the four most recent
years. The table also reports standard errors, estimated by bootstrap methods to allow
for the non-normality of the data.13
Table 2
Mean % exponential growth rates of surviving firms over four-year periods, by entry time
(standard errors in parentheses)
Firms’ years of previous experience:
Year 0 to 3 4+
A. Based on full-time employment*
1974 23.4 (3.0) 13.7 (3.6)
1978 5.5 (0.9) 3.4 (1.7)
1982 6.3 (0.9) 1.9 (1.3)
1988 3.2 (0.9) -0.2 (1.3)
1992 1.6 (0.6) -1.2 (0.8)
1996 3.7 (0.8) 0.6 (0.5)
B. Based on total employment
1974 26.1 (2.9) 14.2 (4.0)
1978 5.0 (0.9) 3.4 (1.7)
1982 6.1 (0.9) 0.9 (1.3)
1988 2.8 (0.8) -0.9 (1.2)
1992 2.7 (0.6) 0.2 (0.8)
1996 3.5 (0.9) 0.9 (0.5)
Note: * Excludes firms with no full-time employees in base year.
The growth rates of firms in the table appear mainly to have fallen over time. They
seem to lie in three distinct periods: high growth in the first four years, medium growth
in the next eight years, and low growth after the structural break in the final twelve
years. Such a slowdown in growth is normal for a new industry as it evolves over a
period of time. The theories predict a possible shift in the relative growth rates of large
and small firms in the periods following the advent of personal computers and the
Internet. The 1982-86 period following the advent of personal computers indeed
exhibits a slight increase in the growth rate of recent entrants and a decrease in the
growth rate of incumbents. The 1996-2000 period exhibits a substantial increase in the
growth rates of both incumbents and recent entrants using full-time employment data,
and a less substantial increase using part-time employment data. A measure of how
much growth rates of entrants have increased compared to those of incumbents is:









I are the mean annual exponential growth rates of entrants and
incumbents respectively in the four-year period beginning year t. Consequence 3 of the
theories implies D>0 for t=1982 and t=1996 if the PC and the Internet were disruptive
technologies affecting competition at these times. Using full-time employment to
measure growth, D=-.077 for t=1978, .024 for t=1982, -.006 for t=1992, and .002 for
t=1996.14 The positive and sizeable value of D for the PC era is consistent with a
portrayal of the PC as a cause of disruptive competitive change, but for the Internet era
D is near zero. None of these values of D is significantly different from zero using 95
per cent confidence intervals computed by bootstrap methods. Thus there is weak
evidence that the PC era may have seen an increase in the growth rate of recent entrants
relative to incumbents, but there is no such evidence for the Internet era.
2.3.3 Application areas of firms
If the advent of personal computers and the Internet gave an advantage to entrants over
incumbents, this may have shown up most directly through greater use of these
technologies by new firms and enhanced survival and growth rates among firms that
used the technologies. Fortunately, the Year Book reported which firms dealt with types
of business involving MS-DOS (the main operating system for PCs) and the Internet. A
third category, network management and design, was also among the various categories
reported by the Year Book and will be examined given its relatedness to Internet
applications.
Consequence 4 of the disruptive technology theories implies that recent entrants are
relatively likely to use radical new technologies. To assess this prediction, Table 3
presents the percentages of recent entrants and incumbents that listed application areas
for their businesses involving MS-DOS in 1987 and the Internet in 1995. For MS-DOS,
entrants were only slightly more likely than incumbents (36 per cent versus 30 per cent)
to have this area of business, and the difference is only marginally statistically
significant. For the Internet, the difference between recent entrants and incumbents is a
multiple of 1.5 times (19 per cent versus 12 per cent), and the difference is highly
statistically significant.15 Thus recent entrants were about as likely as incumbents to
choose areas of business related to personal computers, but were substantially more
likely than incumbents to choose areas of business drawing on Internet-related
technology.
14 Using total employment to measure growth, the conclusions are similar: D=-.104 for t=1978, .036 for
t=1982, -.012 for t=1992, and .000 for t=1996; and these values of D are in no case significantly
different from zero.
15 In Table 3, p-values are computed using Fisher’s exact test.17
Table 3
Application areas of incumbents and entrants
% with application area Sample sizes
Application Recent entrants Incumbents Recent entrants Incumbents p-val.
MS-DOS 1987 35.8 30.0 455 424 .073
Internet 1995 19.0 12.4 914 831 2x10
-4
Table 4
Exit and growth regressions following technology application
Exit following application to: Growth following application to:
PCs Internet PCs Internet
Recent entry 0.30 (0.10) 0.30 (0.07) 0.011 (0.025) 0.011 (0.009)
Technology use -0.31 (0.13) -0.15 (0.15) -0.003 (0.027) -0.028 (0.016)
Entry´Technol. 0.38 (0.18) 0.24 (0.19) 0.026 (0.042) 0.037 (0.022)
Constant -1.86 (0.07) -1.86 (0.07) 0.018 (0.016) 0.010 (0.006)
No 4856 6614 301 783
Consequence 5 of the disruptive technology theories implies that the disruptive
technology matters competitively. Firms that successfully make use of the technology
should have lower exit rates and higher growth rates than similar firms that do not use
the technology. To test whether these outcomes occurred, the firms listed in Table 3 are
treated as samples, and regressions are carried out of exit over the following years
(through the end of the sample) and of mean annual full-time employment growth over
the following four years. As before, logistic regression is used for exit and OLS
regression for growth. Results are reported in Table 4.
Technological impacts on exit and growth are assessed separately for recent entrants
(within four years) and incumbents. To do so, the regressions include three dummy
variables equal respectively to 1 for recent entrants and 0 otherwise, 1 for firms with
applications areas involving the technology and 0 otherwise, and 1 for recent entrants
applying the technology and 0 otherwise.16 The omitted group is incumbents not
applying the technology. Among firms not applying the technology, recent entrants not
surprisingly experienced greater likelihood of exit and more rapid growth. This can be
seen in the positive estimates for the first (Recent entry) coefficient, which is
significantly greater than zero in the exit but not growth regressions. Among firms
applying the technology, the patterns are more interesting. Incumbents had less chance
of exit and slower growth if they applied the technology (since the Technology use
coefficient is uniformly negative). This finding is statistically significant at the .05 level
for exit following the application of PCs and marginally statistically significant at the
16 Controlling for log employment and (in the exit regressions) GDP growth and real mean fees does not
alter the nature of the conclusions.18
.10 level for growth following Internet applications, but insignificant in the other two
regressions. In contrast, the Recent entry´Technology coefficient estimates are
uniformly positive and larger in magnitude than the former coefficient, indicating that
for recent entrants the effect of technology use was opposite that for incumbents. The
difference between recent entrants and incumbents regarding effects of technology is
significant at the .05 level for exit following the application of PCs and marginally
statistically significant at the .10 level for growth following Internet applications, but
insignificant in the other two regressions. Thus the results certainly do not indicate the
uniform benefits of technology use expected if the PC and Internet have been typical
radical disruptive technologies.
One interpretation of these findings is that incumbents with many application areas
(including PCs and Internet) tend to be better established than other incumbents,
yielding the reduced exit and growth typical of large old firms, whereas recent entrants
with applications related to PCs and the Internet tend to be smaller or younger, yielding
the heightened exit and growth typical of small new firms.17 This interpretation would
suggest that the conclusions may be solely spurious and technology does not matter. To
check whether this is so, the size and age distributions of each cohort of firms (recent
entrants and incumbents) was compared between firms that did and did not apply the
technology. As expected, recent entrants that used the technology tended to be smaller
and younger, with a 58 per cent smaller median number of employees in the PC
regressions and a 39 per cent lower mean age in the Internet regressions. Among
incumbents, the age distributions were comparable but firms with PC-related
application areas were actually smaller by about 67 per cent (judging from median full-
time employment) while firms with Internet-related application areas were indeed larger
by about 25 per cent (again judging from median full-time employment). Thus the
interpretation seems valid except for incumbents in the PC era. PC-era incumbents
seemingly may have reaped actual benefits from their choice of application area,
whereas for other firms any benefits associated with applying the technology apparently
seemingly were not powerful enough to override industry trends.
3 Conclusion
This paper has focused on one industry, the UK computer consulting industry, as a
means to probe theories of how computing and communications technology, may so far
have impacted firm and industry structure and the competitive process. The study
intentionally focuses on an IT-driven (and IT-driving) industry that may signal changes
in the competitive process substantially earlier than other IT-related industries. The
competitive consequences of radical, disruptive technological change have been
characterized by several theories that predict a resulting change in competitive
leadership. This study searched for the telltale signs of such a competitive reversal due
to disruptive technology, in the 1980s for the personal computer and in the 1990s up to
2000 for the Internet.
The findings do not match the telltale signs expected if the Internet has been a radical
disruptive technology, although there is modest support for the idea that the personal
17 See for example Evans (1987); Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989); and Geroski (1991).19
computer might have had such an effect. Entry was not much greater following the
introduction of PCs or of the Internet. Exit rose following the introduction of the PC,
but following the introduction of the Internet did not increase until in 1999 (the last year
of exit data) there was a sudden surge of exit, which may or may not be attributed to the
Internet. Changes in exit of incumbents versus recent entrants are consistent with the
idea that both new technologies gave an advantage to upstart firms over incumbents, but
similar changes in growth rates suggested an advantage of upstart firms only in the PC
era not the Internet era. New firms were more likely than incumbents to choose Internet-
related areas of business (but not PC-related areas of business). However, the evidence
does not show consistent survival and growth advantages associated with either PC or
Internet applications; any advantages appear to have been mainly swamped by other
effects such as (incompletely-controlled) age and size effects (there is some evidence of
PC application reducing exit of incumbents). Thus, what modest support there is for the
idea that the PC and the Internet have been disruptive technologies in the sense
described by competitive theories accrues mainly to the PC.
These findings have important limitations, but nonetheless add substantially to the
limited existing research base about IT impacts on firm and industry structure. This
study has no source of direct evidence as to why and how PCs and the Internet may
have affected competition. This study also considers one particular industry, is subject
to data error that reduces ability to discern technology effects, and has a limited time
span in which to investigate possible competitive consequences of PCs and the Internet.
The focus on a single industry might be avoided by studying multi-industry data panels,
as Hitt (1999) and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) do to find evidence of falling firm sizes
associated with greater IT use. However, multi-industry panels may conflate industry
life cycle effects with the phenomenon of study unless such effects are accounted for;
this bias is complicated to address and has not been fully addressed in existing studies
of IT and industry structure. Case studies provide means to probe why and how new
technologies have their effect, but to date such studies of the Internet have been limited
to a small number of firms, obstructing systematic study of whether and why corporate
leadership turnover is spurred by the Internet or other disruptive technologies. Thus
hopefully this study will help to advance in its modest way the emerging stream of
research on ramifications of computers and the Internet for firm and industry structure.
Will the Internet have major effects on market structure in future? Such changes are
entirely possible, but perhaps they will not have the form indicated by theories of
disruptive technology causing market leadership turnover. Indeed, the chairman of
CMG, the largest full-time employer among UK IT consultancies in 2000, writes about
the e-commerce opportunity that:
This is a very significant integration challenge and one that favours the
breadth of skills, resources and experience that companies such as CMG
can offer. Indeed, the majority of major organisations are already turning
to well-established systems integrators for this work, rather than newer
so-called Internet integrators (CMG Annual Report 2000: 7).
This interpretation coincides with Porter’s (2001) argument that the Internet will not
change the dynamics and strategies of business competition, but merely intensify them
and make current strategic concerns all the more relevant. The truth is still a matter to
debate, as attested by the pages of letters in response to Porter’s Harvard Business20
Review article, but at least so far the Internet does not seem to have had the sort of
disruptive technology impacts described by theories of corporate leadership turnover.
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